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Abstract 
The study observes that in the 1980s, India's balance of 
trade deficit showed a tendency to decline in the face of a 
more rapid growth of exports than imports. The five year 
period under NEP(1991-96), however, did not accelerate the 
process. Rather there is some indication for its failure on 
the balance of trade front. Contrary to the claim made in 
certain pro-NEP circles, exports did not pick up, while 
imports accelerated. Due to its failure to control domestic 
inflation vis-a-vis India's trading partners, the real 
(effective) exchange rate of the rupee appreciated in spite 
of substantial depreciation of nominal (effective) exchange 
rate. 
I 
Introduction 
The oil price hikes in the 1970s gave a great shock to the 
Indian economy. Trade deficit mounted up and crossed the 
$7 billion mark by the beginning of the 1980s. But at the 
same time, the balance of invisible trade started showing a 
rising surplus and touched the record figure of $5.5 billion 
(Sarkar, 1996, pp. 532-33). The growing surplus on 
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invisible account owed much to the growth of net private 
transfers, mainly remittance from the Indian workers 
employed in the petro-dollar rich Gulf countries. Because of 
the growing surplus on invisible account, India could square 
her balance of payments deficit and her foreign exchange 
(FOREX) reserve improved. In the late 1970s, proper 
utilisation of accumulated FOREX posed some problem for 
the policy makers. 
It is an irony that by the end of the 1980s, a FOREX 
crisis started showing up its head. As argued in Sarkar 
(1996), the root of the crisis lies in the declining flow of 
petro-dollars in the 1980s and the consequent growing 
deficit in the balance of payments on current account in 
spite of a declining balance-of-trade deficit. By June 1991, 
India's FOREX crossed the danger mark and reached its 
lowest level. 
In the face of this FOREX crisis, India approached 
IMF for help. In accordance with the standard IMF/World 
Bank policy packages (see Sarkar, 1991), the Indian 
currency, rupee, was devalued, import controls started to 
diminish, more and more liberal entry to foreign capital was 
granted and so on. Thus the Indian economy has been 
experiencing a new regime marked by the New Economic 
Policy (NEP); it is a major departure from the 
post-independence model of state controls and 'mixed 
economy'. 
With this background in mind, the present study 
examines India's balance of trade and real exchange rate 
behaviour since 1980 with special reference to the NEP 
period that started around July 1991. Monthly data are 
collected in order to get sufficient observations specially for 
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the NEP period. In the next section, data source and 
methodology are described along with the findings. In 
Section III, summary and conclusions are presented. 
II 
Data Source and Methodology 
Monthly data on Indian foreign trade and real exchange 
rates are available from Reserve Bank oflndia Bulletin and 
IMF International Financial Statistics. The period of 
coverage of our study is January 1980-May 1996 for which 
we have been able to assemble monthly data. 
In order to study the trend-behaviour of all the series 
a log-linear trend equation has been fitted: 
togY, = a + b.t + u, (1) 
where Yt is the time series under study, a is the intercept, 
b is the slope, t is the time variable taken as natural 
numbers1 1, 2, 3, etc. and u t is the error term. 
The estimate of the parameter, b, of equation (1) 
gives a measure of the rate of growth in the series under 
study. 
Initially the trend equation is fitted through the OLS 
(Ordinaiy Least Squares) technique. On the basis of OLS 
residuals, a 12-order Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is 
conducted to ascertain the appropriate error process and the 
trend equation is reestimated through the Gauss-Newton 
Iterative technique (Pesaran et al., 1991). Only the 
statistically significant lags in the error process are taken 
into account in the final estimates of the parameters of the 
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trend equation. 
In using monthly data, the problem of seasonality in 
the series may crop up. To tackle this problem, monthly 
seasonal dummies are added to the trend equation. This 
process of seasonal corrections does not alter much the 
estimates of the parameters. So, to save space, the estimates 
obtained by adding seasonal dummies to the regression are 
not reported. 
In order to examine structural shifts in the series 
under the NEP regime, the period of our study is sliced into 
two sub-periods - pre-NEP period (January 1980-June 1991) 
and NEP period (July 1991-May 1996). Two separate 
regressions are considered - one for the pre-NEP period and 
the other for the NEP period, respectively: 
I. log Yt = a + b.t 
II. log Y t = a' + b'.t 
These two regression equations are combined into a multiple 
regression by adding intercept and slope dummies to 
equation (1): 
log Y t = a + b.t + (a'- a)Dt + (b'- b)D r t + u t (2) 
where \ is the time series under study, t is the time 
variable, a and b are the parameters for the pre-NEP period, 
a' and b' are the parameters for the NEP period, D t is the 
intercept dummy which assumes the value one during the 
NEP period and zero during the pre-NEP period and D,.t is 
the slope dummy which is nothing but the time variable 
during the NEP period and zero otherwise. 
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If the coefficient of, say, slope dummy, (b'- b), is 
statistically significant and positive, it can be concluded that 
the regression equation for the NEP period is different from 
that of the pre-NEP period and that the rate of growth in the 
series is higher during the NEP period (as b' > b). 
We have also examined the stationarity of all the 
series by using the Dicky-Fuller and Augmented 
Dicky-Fuller tests. It is observed that the export and import 
series are trend stationary. But the exchange rate series fail 
to satisfy the tests. However, the procedure of tackling the 
problem of autocorrelated residuals takes care of the 
problem of non-stationarity; the graph of the transformed 
residuals shows a clear case of stationarity in each case. 
Trend Behaviour of India's Foreign Trade, 1980-1996 
First consider the dollar values of India's exports (XDL). 
The series exhibited a trend rate of growth of 0.94 per cent 
per month over the period of our study, January 1980-May 
1996: 
log XDL, = 6.02 + 0.0094t + u, 
(105.55) (20.40) 
where 
u t = 0.48u f-^ 0.17ut.g + et 
(7.54) (2.64) 
€, is the white noise error process, Adjusted R Square = 
0.95, Durbin-Watson Stat.= 2.14 and F(3,175) = 1137.7. 
(t-ratios in parentheses) (3) 
The trend rate of growth of the dollar values of 
imports (MDL) is estimated to be 0.58 per cent per month 
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during the same period: 
log MDL t = 6.74 + 0.0058t + u t 
(99.75) (10.43) 
where 
u t = 0.38ut.j + 0.29u t .g + et 
(5.82) (4.32) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.85, Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.96 
and F(3,179) = 337.75. (t-ratios in parentheses) (4) 
In view of a lower rate of growth of imports, the 
percentage of dollar import bill that is paid for by export 
proceeds (= XDL x 100/MDL), XM,, rose at the 
statistically significant rate, 0.35 per cent per month: 
log XM t = 3.90 + 0.0035t + u t 
(111.89) (11.77) 
where 
u t = 0.39u t l + et 
(5.65) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.69, Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.99 
and F(2,183) = 202.13. (t-ratios in parentheses) (5) I 7 
There is also some evidence of decline in the deficit 
in India's balance of trade in dollar terms, BTDL t. That is 
to say, the balance of trade series exhibited a trend-
improvement at the rate of 0.21 per cent per month (in view 
of negative values, the log-linear trend is fitted by adding an 
arbitrary figure, 1200, to each value of the series so that it 
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becomes positive): 
log BTDLt = 6.46 + 0.002It 4- ut 
(100.44) (3.77) 
where 
u t = 0.48ut.! + et 
(5.53) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.23; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 2.02 
and F(2,183) = 34.54. (t-ratios in parentheses) (6) 
Changes in the Trend Behaviour of Foreign Trade under 
NEP, 1991-96 
The question is whether there was any change in the trend 
behaviour of India's exports and imports under the NEP 
regime - whether the dollar values of India's exports and 
imports faced an acceleration or deceleration under a liberal 
regime. 
Fitting Eq.(2) to the dollar values of India's exports 
(XDL), the following estimates are obtained: 
log XDL, = 6.04 + 0.0092t - 0.48 Dt + 0.0029D t.t + ut 
(90.99) (12.34) (-1.47) (1.39) 
where 
u t = 0.46ut., + 0.17u t g + et 
(7.01) (2.55) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.95; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 2.12 
and F(5,173) = 683.37. (t-ratios in parentheses) (7) 
The estimates reported above show that none of the 
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coefficients of the dummies is statistically significant. That 
means the trend-growth path of the dollar values of India's 
exports is nothing but the continuation of that of the 
pre-NEP period (intercept and slope parameters of the 
regression of the NEP period are not different from those of 
the pre-NEP period). That is to say, the growth of India's 
exports (in dollar terms) did not accelerate during the NEP 
period (July 1991 - May 1996). 
For the dollar value of India's imports (MDL), the 
following estimates are obtained by fitting equation (2): 
log MDL, = 6.79 + 0.0052t - 1.12 D t + 0.0068D t.t + u, 
(110.69) (7.30) (-3.17) (3.05) 
where 
ut = 0.33ut_, + 0.24u t.8 + e t 
(4.91) (3.50) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.85; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.93 
and F(5,177) = 211.77. (t-ratios in parentheses) (8) 
The coefficients of intercept and slope dummies 
reported above are found to be statistically significant; it 
indicates a structural change in the trend-growth path. Since 
the coefficient of slope dummy is positive, it can be 
concluded that the rate of growth in the dollar value of 
India's imports (MDL) during the NEP regime (July 1991 
- May 1996) is higher than that experienced by the pre-NEP 
period since January 1980. In other words, India's imports 
(in dollar terms) showed an accelerated growth under NEP. 
In an earlier study (Sarkar, 1996) covering a shorter 
period, January 1980 - March 1995, there was a weak 
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evidence df acceleration in the growth of imports. The 
present study finds a strong evidence of acceleration as the 
data for the more recent period, April 1995 - May 1996, are 
included. It then seems that the tendency for imports to 
pick up becomes clear with the full bloom of the NEP 
regime. 
In view of an accelerated growth in the dollar values 
of imports, the series on export-import ratio showed some 
evidence of decelerated growth under NEP (the coefficient 
of slope dummy is negative and significant): 
log XM t = 3.89 + 0.0036t + 0.60D t - 0.0035D t.t 
(89.79) (7.28) (2.42) (-2.31) 
where 
u, = 0.32u t., - 0.13u t^ + 0.13 u,.12 4- e, 
(4.50) (-1.86) (1.86) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.68; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.97 
and F(6,168) = 63.47. (t-ratios in parentheses) (9) 
This deceleration in the growth of export/import 
ratio does not necessarily imply an accelerated growth in the 
balance of trade deficit. In fact, the balance of trade series 
(BTDL) showed no sign of structural change under NEP: 
log BTDL, = 6.54 + 0.0065t + 0.92D, - 0.0043D t.t + ut 
(56.89) (0.51) (1.65) (-1.21) 
where 
u, = 0.33u,., + 0.16U,_12 + e, 
(4.57) (2.27) 
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Adjusted R Square = 0.28; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 2 . 0 0 
and F(5,169) = 14.22. (t-ratios in parentheses) (10) 
Behaviour of Exchange Rates of Indian Rupee since 
1980 
During the fixed exchange rate regime of Bretton Woods, 
the exchange rate of the rupee was kept more or less 
constant. In response to a balance of trade crisis, there was 
a once-for-all devaluation of the rupee in June 1966. Since 
1971, with the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime of 
Bretton Woods, the rupee started to float along with the 
other major currencies. The float of the rupee was under the 
management of the Indian monetary authority, the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI). Under the RBI-managed float, the 
rupee started to depreciate. The process of depreciation was 
slow in the 1970s; it accentuated in the 1980s. The NEP 
regime started in July 1991 with a big bang - the rupee was 
devalued twice. In the name of introducing free market 
exchange rate of the rupee, there was another 20 per cent 
devaluation in March 1993. 
The question is whether the nominal exchange rate 
depreciation/devaluation of the rupee led to a 'real' 
depreciation/devaluation. 
To answer this question, a number of RBI series on 
effective exchange rates are analysed. For construction of 
these series, a sample of 36 countries was chosen. These 
countries provided a market for three-fifths of India's 
exports to and imports from the rest of the world. To get 
the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), the bilateral 
exchange rates of the rupee - the SDR-prices of currencies 
of India's trading partners divided by the SDR-price of the 
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rupee - are aggregated by using weights. 
For weighting purpose, two sets of alternative 
weights are used. One set of weights is based on the shares 
of the 36 trading partners as market for India's exports. The 
other set is based on the shares of these countries in India's 
total trade (exports plus imports). Accordingly, two series 
of nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) are available -
export-weighted NEER, XNEER and trade-weighted NEER, 
TNEER. 
In Figure 1, these series are plotted. The two series 
roughly correspond with each other and show a statistically 
significant monthly rate of decline of 0.7 per cent: 
log XNEER, = 4.98 - 0.0069 t + u, 
(59.80) (-10.60) 
where 
ut = 0.95Um + 0.13ut^ - 0.13u t.12 + et 
(34.02) (2.84) (-3.81) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.99; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.86 
and F(4,180) = 15497. (t-ratios in parentheses) (11) 
For calculation of real effective exchange rate, the 
SDR-price of currency of each of 36 major trading partners 
of India is deflated by its consumer price index (which 
reflects the price Indian exporters face in that country) and 
the SDR-price of the rupee is deflated by India's wholesale 
price index (which reflects producers' cost in India). Thus 
the 'real' SDR-prices of the currencies are obtained. The 
ratio between the 'real' SDR-price of currency of each of 
India's trading partners and the 'real' SDR-price of the 
12 
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rupee gives the 'real' bilateral exchange rate of the rupee. 
The real bilateral rates are aggregated by using weights -
export shares or trade shares - as was done in the case of 
constructing NEERs. Accordingly, two series of real 
effective exchange rates (REER) are available - export-
weighted REER, XREER and trade-weighted REER, 
TREER. 
In Figure 2, the two real effective exchange rate 
(REER) series are plotted. These two series also roughly 
correspond with each other and exhibit a monthly rate of 
decline of 0.4 per cent: 
log XREER, = 4.80 - 0.0040t + u t 
(75.69) (-7.75) 
where 
u t = 0.94ut_, + 0.14ut_g - 0.14u,_12 + e, 
(33.18) (3.54) (-4.15) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.99; Durbin-Watson Stat. = 1.82 
and F(4,180) = 5627. (t-ratios in parentheses) (12) 
In view of accelerated inflation under NEP (see 
Sarkar, 1996), the real effective exchange rate of the rupee, 
XREER, changed its pre-NEP (January 1980-June 1991) 
course of steady depreciation in spite of substantial 
devaluation under NEP (July 1991-May 1996): 
log XREER, = 4.80- 0.0040t - 0.77 D, + 0.0043D,.t + u, 
(123.97) (-9.45) (-4.58) (3.63) 
where 
14 
15 
ut = 1.12u t, - 0.21ut_2 + €s 
(15.68) (-3.08) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.99; Durbin-Watson Stat.= 1.98 
and F(5,188) = 6807.3. (t-ratios in parentheses) (13) 
The nominal effective exchange rate (XNEER), 
however, continued to depreciate without any structural shift 
under NEP (July 1991- May 1996): 
log XNEER, = 4.99 - 0.0064t - 0.45D, + 0.0018D,.t + u, 
(38.80) (-5.61) (-1.59) (0.88) 
where 
u, = 0.99u t l - 0.23u,.5 + 0 . 1 8 ^ + e, 
(26.69) (-2.64) (2.37) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.99; Durbin-Watson Stat.= 1.86 
and F(6,184) = 18245. (t-ratios in parentheses) (14) 
Effects of Exchange Rate Movements on the Values of 
Exports and Imports 
To examine the relationship between the real exchange rate 
series and the series of dollar values of exports and imports 
(Xdl and Mdl, respectively), a multiple regression equation 
has been fitted: 
log Y t = a + b.t + c.log XREER, + u, (15) 
where Y, is either Xdl or Mdl. 
In the case of dollar value of exports (XDL,), the estimated 
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equation is: 
log XDL t = 3.73 + 0.0116t + 0.46 log XREER, + u t 
(2.80) (8.16) (1.68) 
where 
ut = 0.47u,.i + 0.15u,5 + 0.15u,.8 + et 
(7.30) (2.38) (2.25) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.96; Durbin-Watson Stat.= 2.13 
and F(5,173) = 659.81. (t-ratios in parentheses) (16) 
Estimates of the parameters given in Equation (16) 
show no statistically significant relationship between the real 
effective exchange rate series and the dollar values of 
India's exports. 
The same result holds good for imports: 
log MDL, = 4.94 + 0.0074t + 0.37 log XREER, + u, 
(3.39) (5.28) (1.22) 
where 
u, = 0.40ut.! + 0.30uM + e t 
(6.24) (4.59) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.84, Durbin-Watson Stat.= 1.96 
and F(6,178) = 659.81. (t-ratios in parentheses) (17) 
Using the nominal effective exchange rate series 
instead of the real one does not tell a different story. 
Structural shift analysis (adding intercept and slope dummies 
to Equation (15) has also been undertaken to examine 
whether the situation changed under NEP. The conclusion 
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was negative for both exports and imports. This contradicts 
Nag et. al. 1994 (see also Sarkar, 1994). 
Ill 
Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, the present study has analysed India's foreign 
trade data between January 1980-May 1996. The dollar 
value of India's exports exhibited a rapid growth since 
1980, exceeding the rate of growth of the dollar value of 
imports. As a result, the percentage of dollar import bill 
paid for by export earnings registered a rising trend. The 
balance of trade deficit showed some tendency to decline. 
Real and nominal effective exchange rates of the rupee 
showed trends of depreciation. But the exchange rate 
movements had no statistically significant relationship with 
the dollar values of India's exports and imports. 
It has also been observed that India's export 
performance under the NEP regime (1991-96) is nothing but 
the continuation of the trend of the 1980s. Trade 
liberalisation under NEP, however, has its effect on 
imports; it shows a tendency to pick up with the passage of 
time under NEP. As a result, the export/import ratio (the 
percentage of dollar import bill paid for by dollar export 
earnings) deviated from its trend growth path of the 1980s 
and showed some sign of deceleration. Although there is no 
evidence of structural change in the trend behaviour of 
India's balance of trade in the 1990s, the situation is 
expected to change in view of an accelerated growth in the 
dollar import bill. 
India's exchange rate policy was also ineffective. 
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Although we find no evidence of statistically significant 
relationship between real exchange rates and the dollar 
values of exports or imports, nominal devaluation of the 
rupee was made to effect a real devaluation. But the NEP 
regime failed to control domestic inflation; it accelerated 
during the NEP regime (Sarkar, 1996). In view of rapid 
inflation vis-a-vis India's trading partners, a steady nominal 
depreciation of the rupee was more than counterbalanced. 
As a result, the real (effective) exchange rate deviated from 
its earlier course of steady depreciation and started showing 
a trend of appreciation during the NEP period. 
Notes 
1. Due to non-availability of data for some months, there 
are jumps in the time variable. 
2. Estimates of the parameters of Equation (2) show that 
there was no trend growth in the balance of trade series 
during the pre-NEP period (January 1980 - June 1991) and 
there was no change in the situation during the NEP period. 
That means, the series exhibited trendlessness over the 
whole period; this contradicts our earlier findings given in 
(6). In view of insignificant slope and intercept dummies, 
estimates given in (6) are to be accepted. 
3. The effective exchange rate series since March 1993 are 
based on Foreign Exchange Dealers' (FEDAI) indicative 
rates. 
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